We generalize the Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) methodology for estimating the costs that could reconcile international portfolio holdings with CAPM predictions. First, we can simultaneously estimate inward and outward investment costs and even interactions between home and host country. Second, the risk aversion parameter is estimated rather than postulated. Third, we control for exchange rate risk, inflation hedging, fixed-interest investments, round-tripping and omitted countries. Over the period 2001-2004, the average implicit shadow costs range from 1 (US and Canada) to 48 (Turkey) percent per annum, too large to correspond to actual cash expenses. We find that the equity home bias is related to a mixture of market frictions, such as information asymmetries, institutional factors and explicit costs.
Introduction
In this paper we build on Cooper and Kaplanis' (CK, 1994 and 2000) idea of estimating a set of deadweight costs that can reconcile actual international portfolio weights with the predictions of the International CAPM (InCAPM). The CK approach provides point estimates of each country's cost of either inward or outward investments, conditional on a postulated value of relative risk aversion. In contrast, we adopt a regression approach: home bias depends on deadweight costs which, in turn, depend on regressors related to international transaction and information costs. The key advantage of this route is that we can measure far more. First, we can estimate simultaneously a home-country cost vector, a host-country one, and even interactions, thus ending up with a complete matrix of costs for all combinations of home and host countries. Second, we are able to estimate relative risk aversion rather than having to assume one, and our estimate is obtained without relying on estimates of expected returns. To our knowledge, our methodology is the first that can measure simultaneously the risk aversion parameter and the implicit costs of international investments. Third, we get more than just point estimates: we can in fact distinguish between coincidences or transient factors and more substantial ones, and we can therefore obtain confidence intervals and significance tests as to both the level of the implied overall deadweight costs and the contribution of the various variables to those overall costs. Fourth, we allow for costs of domestic investment too. The existence of such a cost may explain part of the equity premium puzzle or the divergence between risk-aversion estimates from mean returns versus from intertemporal studies or asset demand. Fifth, we do not have to assume that the capitalization of domestic equity equals the wealth of a country. Lastly, we control for exchange rate risk, inflation hedging, fixed-interest investments, round-tripping and omitted countries. or deviations between actual portfolio holdings and InCAPM predictions. In a way, we even merge both approaches. Conducting this type of research firmly within portfolio theory instead of via stand-alone regression offers a neat and rigorous way of controlling for expectations, to which mean-variance portfolio weights are very sensitive, and for the correlations between each and every country's index. Also, our two-layer approach, where the regressors affect portfolio choices via an implied cost, solves a thorny issue of how to specify the regression. Portfolio theory tells us that, if the information and cost regressors are to bear only on one home and one host country, the left-hand side variable should not be deviations between observed and predicted portfolio weights, nor percentage deviations between these, but differences between covariance risks of assets relative to two imperfectly diversified portfolios. This specification is not only better grounded in theory, but performs substantially better in practice too.
We find that the implied shadow costs of foreign investments vary widely across countries, with plausibly modest figures for established market economies and much higher costs for emerging countries. Over the sample period, the estimates of the shadow costs of exporting capital range between 1 percent for flows into Canada and the US and 48 percent into Turkey or Russia, the two outliers. Informal, information-related costs play a much larger role than explicit cash items like trading costs. Longitudinal replication of the original CK method shows that costs have, generally, come down as one would expect. We estimate the parameter of relative risk aversion to be in the range of 2 to 3.15, which is a very sensible result. For some (emerging) countries, the estimated shadow costs are very high and hard to digest as reflecting real "costs", suggesting that the information-related regressors might partly be proxying for uncertainties not picked up by a regular historic covariance matrix. 1 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we explain the methodology. In Section 2, we describe our data and motivate our choice for the variables affecting international investment costs. Section 3 discusses the empirical results.
I. The Model
Following Cooper and Kaplanis (CK, 1994), we consider a world with N countries and N currencies. Nominal returns are measured in terms of the N th currency. There are N equityindex assets, N − 1 fixed-interest foreign-currency assets and one risk-free domestic security, asset 2N . The ordering of the countries is the same for the equity-index assets and currency assets, and both stock prices and exchange rates are risky processes. For each country l, there 1 One alternative (or complement) to the CK style deadweight costs estimated in this paper would indeed be to assume that investors feel relatively overconfident about home investments and underconfident about foreign markets, resulting in relatively inflated variances for foreign assets. In that case, the home bias would come from the risks instead of from the expected returns (as what is assumed in this study). However, this question goes beyond the scope of this paper and will be the topic of further research.
is a representative investor with a homothetic utility function. Following CK, we assume that when an investor from country l holds stocks from country i, he experiences a proportional deadweight loss of C l i dt in the period dt. This allows the costs of holding stocks to vary by investor and by asset. For the ith asset the net returns to investor l are given by
where µ i and σ i are the annualized expectation and standard deviation of the nominal rate of return on this asset respectively, and dz i is the increment to a standard Wiener process. For notational convenience, dividends and foreign interest are assumed to be capitalized, so that they are included in µ.
The cost of living of an investor of country l, P l , expressed in the reference currency follows a
Brownian motion:
where Π l and σ l π are the annualized expected value and the standard deviation of the instantaneous rate of inflation and dz l π is the increment to a standard Wiener process. Under these assumptions, the optimal portfolio weights of risky assets for any investor l are We now extract the demand for stocks from the above demand equations. Following Sercu (1980), the covariance matrix of risky asset returns is partitioned into:
where Ω S is the covariance matrix of the N stocks and Ω X is the covariance matrix of the N − 1 exchange-rate changes. Familiarly, the inverse of the partitioned covariance matrix can then be interpreted as:
where Γ is a N ×(N −1) matrix, each row containing the (N − 1) multivariate slope coefficients in the regression of the equity return indices on all exchange rate changes and Ω S|X is the N ×N covariance matrix of the errors of these N regressions. Γ is the matrix of Stein (1961), Johnson (1960) hedge ratios and Ω S|X is thus the covariance matrix of the stock returns hedged against exchange risk. This means that we can rewrite the first N rows in equation (3) as
with R e,S the vector of excess equity returns, R e,X the vector of excess currency returns (including foreign interest) and w l S|X the vector of the covariances of investor l's rate of inflation with the N hedged stock returns. If stock holding data are available only for some countries, then the markets omitted from the analysis can be treated in the same way as the exchange rate instruments; notably, the returns on the stocks included in the study should be hedged against currency movements and against returns on omitted stocks. By using hedged stock returns, we control for the effect of exchange rate volatility on international portfolio choices.
Fidora, Fratzscher and Thimann (2006) think that these effects can be substantial.
In the OECD data used by CK, only one element of a country's x l n is available, the own-country investment. So they have in total N observations to estimate potentially N 2 pairwise costs. As a result of these data limitations they can estimate either inward costs or outward costs, but never both simultaneously, and surely no interactions. We, in contrast, have a full N × N data matrix, which would enable us to compute an unconstrained N × N matrix of costs. Those, however, would just be point estimates with zero degrees of freedom. We prefer a regression structure that leaves us degrees of freedom, and allows us to distinguish between coincidences or transient factors and more substantial ones.
The deadweight costs of investing abroad have three sources. The first component is homecountry related (the l-th home effect), including primarily the shadow cost of controls on capital outflows. The second component is related to the host country (the i-th foreign effect), like trading costs and the impact of capital import controls. The third component is an interaction effect; for instance, withholding costs as laid down in bilateral tax treaties are specific for the pair (i, l). But we also recognize that domestic investments may have nonzero costs, even though they are likely to be substantially lower than the costs of international investments.
For riskfree lending and borrowing, lastly, there is assumed to be no cost. Below, we denote variables that are correlated with international costs by h l (for the home variables), f i (for the foreign variables) or a i,l (for interactions), and variables that explain domestic costs by d l .
Then
The demand model in Equation (4) is not yet suited for regression analysis since every single observation x l i depends on expected returns and costs for all host countries i simultaneously. Also, expectations and hedge ratios Γ are hard to estimate. Obtaining an equation where each left-hand-side observation depends just on one C l i , rather than on all, is possible by studying covariances with l's portfolio rather l's portfolio weights themselves. We simply premultiply each side of equation (4) by −Ω S|X and denote the resulting covariance by (minus) y l :
Formally, equation (5) can be understood as:
which says that the covariance of asset i's hedged return with the return of the portfolio chosen by investor l is linearly related to the net expected return on the hedged stock and the covariance of the hedged stock return with investor l's inflation rate. Equation (5) gives us a structure where each y l i depends only on the costs of flows from home l to host i, not to other hosts k. Our procedure also takes into account all (co)variances in a structured and parsimonous way. In contrast, in a simple regression analysis of x l i s one can, at best, bring in just the (co)variances for l and i as regressors, and in an additive way. As a welcome byproduct,
bringing Ω S|X to the left-hand side has also incorporated the estimation errors that are present
in Ω into the regressand instead of the regressor.
We now eliminate the expectations and gammas. Below, we write the equation for residence country l and host country i, we compare it to the equation for residence country i and asset i, and lastly we subtract to get the equation used for estimation: off-shore centers over our sample countries, in proportion to the reported foreign investments of the off-shore centers. 3 Alternatively, we add up the total amount that a country invests in all financial off-shore centers and reallocate these investments over the sample host countries in proportion to the foreign investments of the home country, thus assuming that the final investor takes the decisions and that her preferences are reflected in the country's direct capital flows. 4 Third, we just ignore the financial offshore center and apply the model on a sample where these countries are omitted both as investing and destination country, to test 2 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention. 3 The off-shore financial centers that we considered here are Luxembourg, Ireland, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Panama, the Netherlands Antilles and Guernsey. 4 The following off-shore financial centers are included: Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, This way, we calculate the vector x l n , containing the N proportions of investor l's wealth portfolio invested in each equity index. By premultiplying the vector of relative portfolio weights with the covariance matrix of hedged stock returns, we obtain a new home bias measure that is grounded in mean-variance theory, notably the difference of asset i's covariance risks in the l-th investor's portfolio an the i-th one. Our measure can be compared with the more a first indication that the home bias and therefore the deadweight costs differs wildly between the developed and the emerging economies and that the implicit inward investment costs are much more variable than the outward investment costs. Indices. All stock prices and CPI are in USD. We use ten years of monthly data to calculate the conditional covariances of risky asset returns and inflation rates.
A detailed description of and motivation for the variables that are used to estimate the costs of international investment is listed below. We subdivide each set of regressors into four groups:
one related to implicit costs from information asymmetries; a second related to explicit trading cation by investor-specific characteristics. They find that overconfidence and familiarity or local bias leads to underdiversification. Neither transaction costs nor data acquisition costs do not significantly limit portfolio selection. Instead, the real challenge is to transform data into information.
In this paper we assume information costs to be a broad category of market frictions. They not only contain adverse selection effects (effects of information asymmetries on expected returns), but also the effects of information asymmetries on the variance of the returns that result from different risk perceptions between domestic and foreign investors.
Information costs can not be measured or quantified directly; therefore we introduce a number of variables that can approximate either the ease with which information can be obtained or the complexity of the situation. Some variables can also proxy for risks not picked up by the 10-year historic covariance matrix; for instance, a recent financial crisis or an above-average unemployment or inflation rate is likely to be associated with a rise in risk that is hard to pick up by a 10-year Ω estimate.
A.1 Host-related information variables f i in C(h, f, a)
Host-country GDP. Large, rich countries are more likely to be considered as attractive because the equity investments into that country. We expect that the GDP of the host country has a negative correlation with investment costs.
English-language dummy. We add an indicator that equals unity if the country of host has English as official language. English being the dominant world language, information flows more easily from these countries than towards them, so this lowers the cost of investing into them.
The next three items refer not to information availability but to the degree of uncertainty (and hence potential information asymmetry and adverse selection):
Host-country misery index. A country's misery index is the sum of its inflation and unemployment rates. Initiated by Robert Barro in the 1970's, it measures a country's degree of macro-economic distress, which adds to uncertainty about future policy and hence to information costs. (It could also be interpreted as a "sentiment" variable, but the distinction with adverse selection is subtle, here.) So we expect that the higher the misery index for a country, the higher the implicit costs to invest into that country. Host-country GDP growth. GDP-growth of the host country is measured as the mean rate over the preceding three years. Its effect on investment costs is uncertain. Everything else being the same, we expect fast growing countries to be more attractive to international investment if "sentiment" plays a role. However, high growth may mean more uncertainty and hence higher information and adverse-selection costs. For one thing, most fast growing countries are also emerging countries, about which information is scarce and where uncertainties are often large.
In addition, high expected growth leads to high stock-price multiples, which makes markets quite sensitive to variations in expected growth. 6 Political risk measure. We add two variables to account for the political risk of the host country.
The Opacity index developed by PricewaterhouseCoopers is an average of five risk measures: a corruption-indicator, a measure for legal and judicial opacity (including shareholder rights), an indicator of economic and policy opacity, an indicator for accounting or corporate governance opacity and a factor that refers to the impact of regulatory opacity and uncertainty. 7 High 6 Consider for instance the Gordon model, which says that the prospective price-earnings ratio is P t /X t+1 = 1/(R − g), with R the discount rate and g the growth rate. The growth elasticity of P/E then equals g/(R − g), which rises sharply in g. 
agglomerations (in terms of population). Our source is the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII).
Common-language indicator. Countries that share a common language have a potential information advantage on countries where the languages are different. We include a dummy variable which is equal to unity if two countries share a common language, and expect it to have a negative effect on the costs of international investments. The language dummies are also from CEPII.
Same-region indicator. Following a similar reasoning as for language, dummy variables are added to account for whether two countries are situated in the same region. As in Berkel (2004), we classify the countries by region and construct region dummies. The regional classification of the countries can be found in the Appendix.
Euroland indicator. Lastly, we create a Euro-dummy for the ten countries in our sample that share the same currency. Since the introduction of the fixed exchange rate on January 1, 1999, the level of financial integration between the member countries has increased due to the absence of exchange rate risk, the increase of in cross-country banking, and the reduction of transaction costs. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) show that in 2003, there was a substantial euro-area bias; 48 percent of cross-border equity investments by euro-area members are in other member countries. De Santis and Gérard (2006) and Berkel (2006) show that the establishment of the euro-zone has enhanced financial integration between the member countries and decreased the level of home bias amongst the members. Thus we should expect that the asymmetry of information between those countries has been reduced.
There is a wide range of other variables that one can think of being a proxy for information asymmetries. For example, we have worked with an index of insider trading, a US dummy, a dummy variable for countries that have a common colonial background, share a border or belong to the same legal family. Our final selection was based on multicollinearity issues and, of course, significance and statistical fit of the data.
A.3 Home-related information variables d l and h l
While we can only measure the difference between foreign-and home-investment costs, we can still add control variables that could pick up circumstances where domestic costs are higher or lower than average. This eliminates noise from the C estimates, and also provides information as to whether domestic-investment information costs do vary; if so, this finding would confirm these costs are non-zero. An increase in domestic costs D(d) has the same effect as a fall in foreign costs C(h, f, a).
The home-related information costs mirror the host-related variables: Home-country GDP is a more ambivalent variable than the host country's GDP. On the one hand, world leaders are often also the countries with a high level of technological and financial development, which makes it easier and cheaper for investors to obtain information and do the actual investments abroad. This has a downward effect on foreign investment costs, mirroring the effect of a small host GDP. On the other hand, large economies tend to be more introvert. One argument is that investors from large economies have better diversification opportunities inside their own country already, making international diversification less necessary. True, this effect should already be picked up by the variance-covariance matrix that is incorporated into our dependent variable. But there is likely to be an interaction with information processing too. Residents from, say, Luxembourg, do not need quite as much time to digest all relevant local news as US portfolio managers, so they naturally spend more of their day on foreign news. This effect is not picked up by the covariance matrix, and would make small countries more extravert than large ones even after accounting for (co)variance effects.
There is less ambivalence with the other variables. A high value for the home-country misery index and the home-country opacity index and a low value for the home-country TI CPI-index increases the uncertainty about domestic assets, thus increasing home investment costs and decreasing the net extra cost of foreign investments, everything else being the same. The same holds in case of a unit value for the domestic financial-crisis indicator, signaling a recent crisis in the home country. So we expect that a high value for the domestic misery index, or a recent crisis, lowers the differential information cost of moving funds out.
Our second group of regressors, after these related to information costs, refer to explicit frictions.
B. Explicit frictions: transaction costs and capital restrictions
The items not related to information costs consist of estimated direct costs of trading, and the shadow cost of quantitative restrictions.
B.1 Trading costs. compute the ratio of total market capitalization of stocks available to foreign investors over total market capitalization, but this index captures only one aspect of the intensity of capital controls, is available only for certain emerging countries and does not provide any information on restrictions on outflows. We want a separate index for outward and inward controls, with maximal country coverage. Thus from the AREAER dummies we develop two new indices ourselves, one for inflows and one for outflows, by counting how many of 15 possible restrictions were adopted by the country. We try to account for the intensity of capital controls by making a distinction between prohibitions, a need for prior approval or authorization, limitations on contract agreements, and notifications. 9 Details on the construction of our measures of capital controls can be found in the Appendix. Obviously, capital controls on both inflows and on 9 During our sample period, for example, Indonesian mutual funds and insurance companies are prohibited to invest abroad, while in Japan foreign investments of insurance companies are limited to maximum 30 percent of their total assets. In contrast to most traditional measures of capital controls, the more restrictive nature of the controls of Indonesia is reflected in our index.
outflows are expected to have a positive impact on the costs on international investment.
Our third group of regressors refer to measures of financial development.
C. Financial development
Channeling savings to where they can be invested most efficiently requires established payment systems; the availability of information on the economy, the companies and the asset prices;
and a way to manage and to control risk. Equity prices are more informative in well developed financial markets. Thus, financial development is likely to be associated with both lower information costs and lower explicit frictions.
Common measures for financial development are the ratio of private credit provided by the banking sector to GDP or the ratio of M2 to GDP. These measures focus on the banking sector. They might not be appropriate to measure financial development of the equity markets because a well developed or very large banking sector does not always imply that the equity markets are well developed. In fact, banking and stock markets can be substitutes-think of Germany. Therefore, we create a new measure that is equal to the sum of domestic credit Stock-market liquidity is known to be a major determinant of bid-ask spread in order-driven markets, and of price pressure in price-driven markets. But it is also correlated with volatility and the prevalence of insider trading, two information-related variables. Either way, a high liquidity lowers costs. So higher host-country liquidity lowers the total expense of investing there, and higher domestic liquidity increases comparative outward costs. We measure liquidity as the ratio of annual turnover over market capitalization. Annual turnover is obtained from
Datastream.
We lastly turn to two control variables.
D. Others
In addition to the variables above, we add two variables that might explain part of the implicit costs of international investments. A first variable is the standardized skewness for the return of the host-country, to capture non-gaussian features in the distribution. We expect that investors prefer positive skewness in returns, thus this variable is expected to have a negative effect on investment costs. As a second variable, we add bilateral imports of country l from country i relative to the GDP of country l. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) and MilesiFerretti (2004, 2005) show that the bilateral trade in goods are strongly correlated with bilateral equity investments. We expect a negative correlation between bilateral imports and implicit deadweight costs. Table II summarizes the variables that are used to estimate the costs of international investment, together with their expected sign of correlation with these costs.
III. Estimation and Results

A. Estimation
The test equation (7) has as its left-hand side variable the differential portfolio covariance risks
of asset i for investors l and i, and on the right the net cost differential NC(H l,t , F i,t , A l,i,t , D l,t )
and the asset's differential inflation-hedging potential:
where H l,t , F i,t , A l,i,t and D l,t are vectors containing the sources of home-related costs, hostrelated costs, interaction-type costs and domestic costs respectively.
We specify the costs of international investment as an exponential function of the above regressors. This guarantees that fitted costs end up as positive numbers. It also minimizes the impact of the estimate of risk tolerance on the estimated coefficients. Indeed, only the constant in the exponent (c, below) must be inferred using the estimate of α; the other coefficients of the cost function are not directly affected by the estimated α:
where c = c + log(α) and
We estimate equation (8) using the General Method of Moments (GMM) with a Newey-West weighted covariance matrix such that the GMM-estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. All right hand sides variables of equation (8) are used as instruments. We report the results of the model using the three different allocations of investments in financial 
B. Empirical Results
Table III summarizes the estimation results of equation (8) . Recall that we use three different allocation methods for the investments in financial off-shore centers. The first two columns (Result 1) show the estimation results when we reallocate the investments in off-shores over the destinations in proportion to the foreign investments of these centers reported to the CPIS. Our second introductory observation is that, across the years, there is a reassuring degree of consistence in the values of the coefficients and the patterns of significance/insignificance. Third, relative risk aversion is estimated to be significantly positive and smaller than unity.
Significant risk tolerance of course means a significant estimated relative risk aversion. Our estimates of relative risk aversion range between 1.4 and 3.14, which are highly acceptable estimates and can be compared with the estimates by Apte et al. (2004) , extracted from real exchange rates and real consumption data, or Friend and Blume's (1975) estimate, around 3.
The estimated risk tolerance parameter is significantly lower than unity, producing a sizable demand for the inflation-hedge portfolio. Note that this does not necessarily mean that stocks are good hedges against inflation. Indeed, assuming that inflation covariances are all zero, the second fund in demand equation (8) would just contain the risk-free asset, and would still be held if risk aversion exceeds unity. We tested this by regressing the hedged stock return of country l on all 37 inflation differentials (Π l − Π i ), (l = i) and conducting a Wald test to verify whether the coefficients are simultaneously significant. We could reject the nullhypothesis of non-significance only once out of 38 countries (not shown). This suggests that inflation hedging is insignificant and thus the second fund is demanded for its risk-reducing characteristics relative to the first one, the log-utility portfolio. This is in line with earlier results by e.g. Adler and Dumas (1983) or CK.
The main interest is, of course, in the levels and determinants of transaction costs. We discuss these in turn. Table IV what we really see is not increased home bias due to rising costs but to proportionally large privatizations that strongly targeted the local small investor. Sweden's exceptionally high initial cost reflected capital controls, lifted in the later eighties; we see costs duly plummet as of then. Japan is a lone outsider, with the imputed cost of inward investments rising as its market slumped in the first half of the 1990s. Lastly, and most crucially, also CK-style cost estimates for 2001-04 are falling, and their levels seem to be well in line with the general trend of the 1990s. For France, Germany, Japan and the UK, the estimated CK-style deadweight costs are still lower than the ones estimated by Glassman and Riddick for the period 1985-1990. Still, the high implicit costs for the emerging markets (up to 48 percent per annum) are very unlikely to reflect real "costs". Therefore, an alternative explanation could be that the home bias is caused not (only) by a foreign equity return reducing cost factor, but (also)
B.1 Estimated cost levels and trends
by an increased perception of foreign risk. This would mean that (part of) the deadweight costs estimates are just proxies for variance-inflation effects. The answer to this question goes beyond the scope of this paper and will be the topic of further research.
B.2 Determinants of costs
A first observation is that the implicit costs of international investments are almost exclusively due to the host country or to interactions between the host and home country. Domestic investment costs are either insignificant or come up with the wrong sign. Information-related frictions significantly influence implicit deadweight costs during the sample period: between thirteen and fifteen out of eighteen information-related variables turn out to be significant.
Among the host-country regressors that are expected to correlate with costs of investing abroad, the misery index, GDP growth, and crisis variables are significant and have positive coefficients, suggesting that they all increase uncertainty and the costs that go with it. Host-country GDP, the TI corruption perception index and the English-language indicator both come up with a significantly negative sign, as expected. The two political risk variables show contradicting evidence. One reason seems to be that the variables are too similar and cause multicollinearity problems: when we drop the TI CPI (not shown), the coefficient for the host country opacity index behaves as expected.
On the home-country side, none of the information related variables has a significant effect on implicit investment costs.
All four interaction variables are significant, three of them with the expected signs: sharing the same language or living in the same region reduces information costs. On top of the regioneffect there is an information advantage for members of the euro-area, which is consistent with the euro-area bias documented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) . Contrary to what was expected, the distance variable comes up with a significantly negative sign. The estimated model is that of equation (8) 1.07 *** 6.26
1.85 *** 3.31 Table IV : Coefficient estimates and t-statistics, subsamples
The estimated model is that of equation (8) The level of development of the financial markets of the host country does influence implicit investment costs. However, the results depend on the method of reallocation of investments in financial off-shore centers. We find that, if the investments in off-shores are reallocated proportional to their reported foreign investments, "outside" corporate financing as a fraction of GDP in the host country decreases the costs of investing into that market. If we reallocate the investments proportional to the foreign investments of the home country, the liquidity variable comes up with a significantly negative sign. For the subsamples, we find that both 
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we use actual portfolio holdings to estimate the implicit costs for an investor to diversify internationally. This integrates the work of Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) on costs of investments with the studies of determinants of international capital flows and yields a methodology that allows us to estimate the costs on inward and outward investment, their determinants, and the universal risk tolerance parameter simultaneously. We also account for interaction effects between two countries. The technology is applied to a fairly wide cross section of countries, 38 of them, over four years. We also apply the original CK algorithm to a smaller cross section of nine countries over 19 years.
There are several contributions to the home bias literature. We come up with a new home bias measure that is completely grounded in mean-variance portfolio theory. Our methodology allows to estimate the risk tolerance parameter instead of postulating one. We provide a neat solution to account for exchange rate risk and missing stock markets. Investments through financial centers have less impact than is sometimes feared. Finally, estimate the implicit costs of international investments using a regression approach, so that we get not only point estimates, but also significance tests on our estimated costs.
We find that the implicit costs to invest in less developed countries are substantially higher than the costs to invest in developed countries. Thus, investors find early-stage countries too costly, even taking into account the advantages of low correlation with major markets and the positive skewness in the returns of emerging countries. These countries typically have less developed financial markets, a lower GDP, and higher inflation and unemployment rates than the industrialized countries. They are also more likely to have suffered from a financial crisis. Most emerging countries have underdeveloped information channels and procedures, which can increase the costs for both residents and foreigners to acquire information on certain companies, resulting in a total cost of foreign investment that is far higher than the explicit costs that are actually charged (transaction costs, withholding taxes). Indeed, while most information-related coefficients are significant with signs that make sense, this is far less the case with the cash-cost variables; thus, information and financial development seems to be the key.
Our estimates of the implicit costs to invest in a developed country, in contrast, are lower than estimates reported earlier (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Coën, 2001; Glassman and Riddick, 2001 
A2. Composition of the capital control indices
The AREAER capital account transactions are subdivided into fourteen categories. 
